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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 940758-CA 
V. : 
ROGELIO LIMONTA LEYVA, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This an appeal from a conviction for failure to respond 
to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (1993). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1995). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly conclude that 
defendant's waiver of Miranda rights was knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary? 
A trial court's legal conclusion of a valid Miranda 
waiver is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
941 (Utah 1994). "However, this standard of review grants a 
measure of discretion to the trial court because of the 
variability of the factual settings." Id. Indeed, "[i]n the 
face of a factual dispute which necessarily bears upon 
credibility, it [is] for the trial court to appropriately weigh 
the evidence and assess credibility of the witnesses." State v. 
Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 299 (Utah 1992). These underlying factual 
determinations are reviewed for clear error. Id. Accord State 
v. James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1016 (Utah App. 1993). 
2. Did the trial court properly limit defendant's 
cross-examination of Trooper Wassmer? 
Defendant's constitutional challenge is waived for 
failure to adequately raise it below, State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 
1141, 1144-45 (Utah 1989), and for failure to articulate a plain 
error or other exceptional circumstance excusing the waiver. 
State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 705 n.2 (Utah App. 1993); State 
v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1992). Defendant's 
evidentiary challenge is waived for failure to comply with the 
briefing rule. Utah R. App. Pro. 24(a)(9); State v. Price, 827 
P.2d 247, 249 n.5 (Utah App. 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with failure to respond to an 
officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (1993), and possession of a controlled 
substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)(1994), which charge was subsequently 
dismissed (R. 7-8, 21). 
Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained in 
alleged violation of the state and federal constitutions (R. 23-
2 
24). Following an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the trial 
court denied defendant's motion (R. 63-66). 
A jury trial was held October 11-12, 1995, at the 
conclusion of which defendant was convicted as charged (R. 147). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to zero to five 
years in the Utah State Prison, to be served consecutive to any 
other term defendant was then serving (R. 153). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
At approximately 9:00 p.m. on the evening of July 24, 
1994, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Jon Wassmer was patrolling 
south bound traffic on 1-15 near 4500 South in Salt Lake City, 
Utah (R. 208). A yellow car travelling ahead of the trooper 
caught his attention because it was "sagging badly to one side" 
(R. 209). Surprised that the yellow car could have passed 
inspection, Trooper Wassmer ran a license plate check based on 
his suspicion that the driver had switched the plates on the car 
(R. 209). Dispatch reported that the plates on the yellow car 
were registered to a 1984 Buick (R. 210). Trooper Wassmer pulled 
up alongside the yellow car and confirmed that it was not a 
Buick, but a 1988 Oldsmobile (R. 210). Defendant, who was the 
sole occupant of the car, glanced over at the trooper as he 
travelled along side of defendant's car (R. 210-11). 
1
 Since the primary issue on this appeal is the 
suppression issue, the pertinent facts are gleaned from the 
transcript of the suppression hearing held September 26, 1994 (R. 
205-243). 
3 
Based on the license plate violation, Trooper Wassmer 
determined to stop defendant's car (R. 211). He turned on his 
overhead emergency lights and pulled up within a few feet of 
defendant's rear bumper (R. 211). Defendant immediately sped up, 
increasing his speed from approximately 55 m.p.h. to 75 m.p.h. 
(R. 212). Trooper Wassmer turned on his siren and began to 
pursue defendant's fleeing car (R. 212). Trooper Wassmer 
observed that defendant "was just jamming his way through 
traffic," forcing other drivers to "take evasive type action" (R. 
212). Defendant "passed in the emergency lane when all the lanes 
were occupied, much faster than the traffic flow" (R. 212). 
At one point defendant started down the 7200 South off-
ramp "and then he cut back across . . . the painted island, and 
back on to the freeway" (R. 212). In pursuing the fleeing 
vehicle, Trooper Wassmer observed defendant "speeding, cutting 
people off, passing in the emergency lane, . . . [and] following 
too close" (R. 212). 
Defendant left the interstate again at the 9000 South 
off-ramp, again "pass[ing] to the right of a vehicle[] in the 
emergency lane" (R. 213). The chase came to end when defendant 
crashed at the bottom of the off-ramp: "[H]e was going way too 
fast to take the turn at the bottom . . . , and he crashed into 
the island" (R. 213). As the trooper approached to arrest him, 
defendant put his hands in the air (R. 214). 
Trooper Wassmer immediately handcuffed and searched 
defendant before placing him in the patrol car (R. 214-15). 
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Trooper Wassmer did not read defendant his Miranda2 rights at 
that time, waiting instead until he "intended to do formal 
questioning" (R. 215). However, in the course of handcuffing 
defendant, Trooper Wassmer did ask, "So why were you running from 
me?" (R. 229). Trooper Wassmer may have also inquired if 
defendant was on probation and also asked about cocaine in plain 
view in the car, all prior to advising defendant of his Miranda 
rights (R. 224).3 
Trooper Wassmer conducted formal questioning on these 
same topics after defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, 
one half hour after his arrest (R. 223, 229-30). Trooper Wassmer 
asked defendant if he understood each of his Miranda rights (R. 
216). Defendant responded "Yes" (R. 216). Trooper Wassmer then 
asked defendant: "Having these rights in mind, do you want to 
talk to us now?" (R. 216). Defendant said, "I don't know" (R. 
216). Trooper Wassmer explained that defendant "didn't have to 
talk to [them] if he didn't want to. He didn't have to answer 
questions. [x]Its up to you.[']" (R. 217). Defendant indicated 
that he understood the trooper's explanation by nodding his head 
up and down (R. 217). Noting defendant's affirmative response, 
the trooper asked: "So why did you run?" (R. 217). Defendant 
2
 See Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966)• 
3
 Defendant's responses to Trooper Wassmer's pre-Miranda 
questioning were not introduced at the suppression hearing. 
5 
replied, "The plate's on the wrong car[J" and also stated "that 
he [was] out past time" (R. 217)4. 
Approximately 15 minutes later, while defendant was 
being transported to the county jail, he initiated further 
conversation with the trooper (R. 218). Specifically, defendant 
asked, "So what are you charging me with?" (R. 218). Trooper 
Wassmer told defendant that he would be charged with "[e]vading, 
improper registration, no driver's license, no insurance, and 
possession of cocaine" (R. 218). Defendant stated: "Hey, man, 
I'll admit to everything else, but the cocaine isn't mine" (R. 
218). Seeking clarification of defendant's admission, Trooper 
Wassmer asked defendant: "So you admit you saw my lights and were 
trying to run from me?" (R. 219). Defendant said, "Yeah, I was, 
but the cocaine isn't mine" (R. 219). 
During the entirety of his encounter with defendant, 
Trooper Wassmer experienced no difficulty communicating with 
defendant in English (R. 229). Trooper Wassmer observed that 
defendant spoke English well and appeared to understand the 
trooper's questions (R. 229). 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress 
"all statements made by him to police" (R. 23), and a motion in 
limine to exclude: 1) "all evidence concerning alleged cocaine 
found in proximity to [defendant] . . . ; 2) all evidence that 
[defendant] was on probation . . . ; 3) all evidence of 
4
 A reference to defendant's status as a probationer (R. 
219) . 
6 
[defendant's] criminal history; and 4) any other evidence which 
the prosecution intends to present which reflects poorly on 
[defendant's] character . . ." (R. 25-26). 
An evidentiary hearing was held on September 26, 1995. 
In argument to the court, the prosecutor clarified that he did 
not intend to introduce any evidence of defendant's cocaine 
possession or other bad acts evidence; nor did he intend to 
introduce any conversation that occurred between defendant and 
Trooper Wassmer prior to the administration of Miranda warnings 
(R. 231, 239). I 
Defense counsel argued that the trooper should have 
tape recorded his conversation with defendant, that defendant was 
entitled to a Miranda warning prior to any questioning; and that 
defendant had not waived his Miranda rights, but had equivocally 
invoked his right to silence (R. 235-36). Finally, defense 
counsel challenged the voluntariness of defendant's admissions 
(R. 237). 
In light of the prosecutor's representation that he 
would not attempt to introduce defendant's pre-Miranda 
statements, the trial court denied defendant's motion to 
suppress, finding as follows: 
Trooper Wassmer arrested defendant and a few 
moments later, in Trooper Wassmer's car, 
advised the defendant of his Miranda rights 
by reading them from a standard DUI form. 
Trooper Wassmer asked the defendant if he 
understood his Miranda rights. The defendant 
replied[,] "Yes." 
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Trooper Wassmer asked the defendant if he 
would answer questions. The defendant 
stated[,] "I don't know." Trooper Wassmer 
said[,] "You don't have to answer questions 
if you don't want to. It's up to you." The 
defendant nodded his head in an affirmative 
manner. 
Trooper Wassmer then asked, "So why did you 
run?" The defendant immediately answered, 
"The plates are on the wrong car." 
Trooper Wassmer did not record this conversation. 
(R. 63-64) (a complete copy of the trial court's Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, is attached as addendum A). 
Based on the above findings, the trial court concluded: 
Proper Miranda warnings were administered to 
[] defendant by Trooper Wassmer. 
[D]efendant understood his Miranda rights. 
[D]efendant knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before 
questioning ensued. 
The questions and answers given post-Miranda 
are admissible in the trial. 
Trooper Wassmer's in the field unrecorded 
questioning of the defendant did not violate 
any of [] defendant's constitutional rights. 
(R. 65), see addendum A. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
It is well established that absent any record of 
coercion, the mere fact of a prior Miranda violation does not 
render inadmissible admissions obtained following a subsequent 
and valid waiver of Miranda rights. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 
298 (1985). Because there is no claim or record of coercion 
S 
regarding either defendant's pre- and/or post-Miranda admissions 
in this case, the trial court properly ruled that defendant's 
post-Miranda statements were admissible. 
Upon being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant was 
initially uncertain whether he wanted to speak with police. 
However, he nodded his head affirmatively when Trooper Wassmer 
further explained that he did not have to talk if he did not want 
to. Additionally, defendant, unhesitatingly gave an 
incriminating response to the trooper's follow-up questioning. 
Recent controlling authority from the United States Supreme Court 
definitively held that police are not required to cease 
questioning of a suspect who has equivocally invoked his right to 
counsel, nor are they limited solely to asking clarifying 
questions. Davis v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (1994). Thus, 
analogizing to the instant facts, the trooper's questioning of 
defendant was proper. Further, the Utah Supreme Court has held 
similar affirmative conduct in response to police questioning to 
constitute a valid Miranda waiver. State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385 
(Utah 1986); State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39 (Utah 1987). 
Accordingly, the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion 
to determine that defendant's waiver of Miranda rights was 
knowing, intelligent and voluntary. 
POINT II 
Defendant's complaint that the trial court's limitation 
of his cross-examination of Trooper Wassmer violated his 
constitutional right of confrontation is not properly before 
9 
Court- Defendant failed to specifically preserve his claim of 
constitutional error below; nor has he asserted plain error or 
other exceptional circumstance excusing his waiver on appeal. 
The trial court properly determined under rule 403, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, that defendant's attempt to cross-examine 
the trooper concerning the omission of the Miranda violation from 
his report, without also bringing out defendant's previously 
suppressed and incriminating statements, would unnecessarily 
confuse and mislead the jury. Defendant has failed to adequately 
challenge the trial court's rule 403 determination in his brief 
on appeal. He only briefly describes the perceived effect of the 
court's ruling on his defense and offers no analysis regarding 
how or why the evidentiary ruling constitutes an abuse of the 
trial court's broad discretion. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d, 932, 
938 (Utah 1994). Consequently, the issue is waived due to 
defendant's non-compliance with the briefing rule. Utah R. App. 
P. 24(a)(9); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 n.5 (Utah App. 
1992). 
In any event, the right to confrontation is properly 
limited by rule 403. The trial court made a well considered 
determination that the limited probative value of impeaching the 
trooper with the omission of the Miranda violation from his 
report was outweighed by its strong tendency to confuse and 
mislead the jurors, particularly if introduced in the isolated 
context requested by defendant. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT 
DEFENDANT'S WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS WAS 
KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND VOLUNTARY 
The trial court's conclusion that defendant 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda 
rights is well supported in the record. Defendant does not 
dispute the trial court's findings that Trooper Wassmer advised 
him of his rights and that he told the trooper he understood 
those rights (R. 64), see addendum A. While defendant initially 
told the trooper that he did not know if he wanted to waive his 
rights, defendant does not dispute that he subsequently nodded 
his head in understanding when Trooper Wassmer explained that he 
"didn't have to talk . . . if he didn't want to," nor does 
defendant dispute that he then proceeded to answer the trooper's 
questions (R. 64), see addendum A. 
Rather, defendant challenges the trial court's waiver 
determination on the narrow grounds that the trooper's pre-
Miranda questioning impermissibly tainted his post-Miranda 
statements, and that his "mere nodding of the head" was 
inadequate to constitute a valid Miranda waiver. Br. of App. at 
11-16, 20, 23, 27. Defendant's contentions lack merit. 
A. Pre-Miranda Confession Does Not Bar Admission of Post-
Miranda Statements 
In Point 1(A) of his brief, defendant claims that his 
unwarned confession "let the cat out of the bag[;]fl consequently, 
11 
his later confession, obtained after a Miranda waiver, is 
barred.5 Br. of App. at 12, 16. The Utah Supreme Court 
considered and rejected a similar challenge to the admission of a 
post-Miranda confession in State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1016 
(Utah 1993). See also State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 465-66 
(Utah 1988). As recognized in James, the United States Supreme 
Court "definitively addressed" this issue Oregon v. Elstad, 470 
U.S. 298 (1985) . 
Elstad clarified that the "Fifth Amendment prohibits 
only coerced confessions." James, 858 P.2d at 1016 (citing 470 
U.S. at 306-07) (emphasis added). While Miranda warnings are 
intended to serve the Fifth Amendment goal, they may also 
"sweep[] more broadly" than the amendment. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 
306. Specifically, "[f]ailure to administer Miranda warnings 
creates a presumption of compulsion." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307 
(emphasis added). Thus, Miranda can be "triggered even in the 
absence of a Fifth Amendment violation." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 
306. For example, "unwarned statements that are otherwise 
voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must 
nevertheless be excluded from evidence under Miranda." Elstad, 
470 U.S. at 307. 
Significantly, however, Elstad further clarified that 
the presumption of coercion attendant to a pre-Miranda confession 
does not attach to a later confession, obtained after a Miranda 
5
 The State's refutation of defendant's claim of an 
inadequate waiver is set forth in Part B, infra. 
12 
waiver. Indeed, "once warned, the suspect is free to exercise 
his own volition in deciding whether or not to make a statement 
to the authorities." Elstad at 308. Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court ruled that 
absent deliberately coercive or improper 
tactics in obtaining the initial statement, 
the mere fact that a suspect has made an 
unwarned admission does not warrant a 
presumption of compulsion. A subsequent 
administration of Miranda warnings to a 
suspect who has given a voluntary but 
unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice 
to remove the conditions that precluded 
admission of the earlier statement. 
470 U.S. at 314. Under the above circumstance, Elstad concludes 
that a trial court could reasonably determine that a suspect 
"made a rational and intelligent choice whether to waive or 
invoke his rights." Id. 
Applying Elstad and James to the instant facts, the 
crucial issue is the voluntariness of defendant's second, post-
Miranda confession, and not whether it can be tied to the 
13 
presumptively involuntary first confession.6 It is therefore 
significant that defendant makes no claim and points to no record 
evidence of coercion regarding either the circumstances of his 
initial unwarned confession, or his subsequent warned admissions. 
Br. of App. at 11-16. See James, 858 P.2d at 1016 ("Unless the 
record indicates otherwise, failure to administer a Miranda 
warning before interrogating defendant does not create a 
presumption that defendant's second confession was compelled."); 
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 466 (affirming admission of Bishop's warned 
statements, citing absence of police coercion during both pre-
and post-Miranda questioning). 
6
 To the extent that defendant's subheading 1(A) and n.4 
suggest the Court must engage in an attenuation analysis to 
determine if his confession was obtained in the course of police 
exploitation of a prior illegality, the argument is waived. 
Defendant made no argument concerning the alleged necessity of an 
attenuation analysis below and his vague and unanalyzed 
references to the argument on appeal are inadequate under the 
briefing rule. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah App. 
1992). See also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("The argument shall 
contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect 
to the issues presented, including the grounds for review any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."). 
Defendant has not alleged plain error or any exceptional 
circumstance to excuse his waiver of the issue. State v. Brown, 
856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993). 
Moreover, the Miranda violation alleged here does not 
amount to a constitutional deprivation, let alone a Fourth 
Amendment violation of the type necessitating an attenuation 
analysis. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306 ("a procedural Miranda 
violation differs in significant respects from violations of the 
Fourth Amendment, which have traditionally mandated a broad 
application of the 'fruits' doctrine.11). See also State v. 
Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 300 (Utah 1992) (engaging in attenuation 
analysis to determine effect of alleged illegal arrest, a fourth 
amendment issue, on Allen's post-Miranda admissions). 
14 
Because there is no claim or record of coercion before 
the Court, and because the mere fact of the prior Miranda 
violation does not create a presumption of coercion attendant to 
defendant's post-Miranda admissions, the trial court did not 
abuse its broad discretion in rejecting defendant's claim of 
involuntariness on these facts. 
B. Acknowledgment of Understanding and Affirmative 
Response to Police Questioning Constitutes Valid 
Miranda Waiver 
Turning to defendant's challenge to the trial court's 
waiver determination, the Utah Supreme Court recently reiterated 
that "police may question an individual who agrees to speak with 
them after being read his Miranda rights." State v. Villarreal, 
889 P.2d 419, 426, (Utah 1995). In Point 1(B) of his brief, 
defendant asserts that his "mere nodding of the head was not an 
appropriate clarification" of his intention to waive his Miranda 
rights and therefore all statements made following the warning 
should be suppressed. Br. of App. at 23. Significantly, 
defendant does not dispute that he understood his Miranda rights, 
or that he never unequivocally invoked his rights. Br. of App. 
at 17-29. Further, as previously noted in Part A, supra, 
defendant makes no assertion that he was physically or 
psychologically coerced into relinquishing his Miranda rights. 
Id.7 Consequently, the issue before the Court is whether, in 
7
 See State v. Heaelman, 717 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Utah 1986) 
("Evidence sufficient to support a finding that a confession is 
involuntary must reveal some physical or psychological force or 
manipulation that is designed to induce the accused to talk when 
he otherwise would not have done so."). 
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spite of an equivocal invocation of the right to silence, 
defendant's subsequent affirmative head nodding and incriminating 
responses to police questioning constituted a valid Miranda 
waiver. 
As further noted in Part A, supra, the Fifth Amendment 
guarantees a criminal defendant that he "shall not be vcompelled 
. . . to be a witness against himself.'" State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 
70, 81, (Utah 1993) . To that end, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 444 (1966), established procedural safeguards requiring 
police to inform a suspect that he has the right to remain silent 
and the right to have an attorney present during questioning. 
Wood, 868 P.2d at 81. However, it is the suspect's burden to 
affirmatively invoke his right to silence. State v. Calamity, 
735 P.2d 39, 41 (Utah 1987) (quoting Hegelman, 717 P.2d at 1349) . 
Accordingly, a Miranda waiver may be inferred from a suspect's 
"acknowledgement of [] understanding" and "subsequent course of 
conduct," id,, , including "actions and words [.]" State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 941 (Utah 1994) (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 
441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)). A Miranda waiver is determined under 
the totality of the circumstances and it is the State's burden to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was 
voluntary, knowing/ and intelligent. Wood, 868 P.2d at 81; 
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 463; Calamity, 735 P.2d at 41. 
Defendant's equivocal, "I don't know," response to 
Trooper Wassmer'g initial request for a Miranda waiver does not 
constitute an affirmative invocation of the right to silence. 
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Calamity, 735 P.2d at 41; Hecrelman, 717 P.2d at 1349.8 In State 
v. Kelly, the Utah Supreme Court considered similar equivocating 
conduct and upheld the trial court's waiver determination. 718 
P.2d 385, 392 (Utah 1986). Like defendant, Kelly initially 
hesitated when, following the giving of Miranda warnings, police 
asked if he wanted to answer questions, stating: "I don't know. 
It depends." Kellv, 718 P.2d at 392. An officer told Kelly that 
he "needed a yes or no answer, but [Kelly] did not respond." Id. 
at 388. The officer then asked what Kelly had been wearing that 
night and Kelly pointed to clothing lying at his feet. Id. When 
the officer picked up the clothing, Kelly spontaneously stated 
that he wanted to level with police and made certain admissions. 
Id. 
In affirming the trial court's Miranda waiver ruling, 
the supreme court held that in view of Kelly's initial equivocal 
response, it was proper for the police to ask further questions. 
Id. at 392. The supreme court also cited Kelly's affirmative 
8
 Indeed, defendant's authority deals primarily with the 
procedures to be followed upon an equivocal invocation of Miranda 
rights. See Br. of App. at 17-29 (citing State v. Sampson, 808 
P.2d 1100 (Utah App. 1990) and State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894 
(Utah App. 1993)). To the extent Sampson and Gutierrez mandate 
that only clarifying questions may be asked once a suspect 
equivocally invokes his Miranda rights, they are overruled by 
recent controlling authority from the United States Supreme 
Court, Davis v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (1994). Davis 
definitively held that police are not required to cease 
questioning of a suspect who has equivocally invoked his right to 
counsel, nor are they limited solely to asking clarifying 
questions. 114 S.Ct. at 2355-56. Thus, analogizing to the 
instant case, Trooper Wassmer's post-Miranda questioning of 
defendant was proper. 
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conduct in spontaneously responding to the officer's questions 
with particular admissions. Id. Accord Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 
2355-56. 
Calamity is another factually similar case further 
emphasizing that affirmative conduct in response to police 
questioning constitutes a valid Miranda waiver. Calamity, 735 
P.2d at 41. Unlike defendant and Kelly, Calamity made no 
arguably equivocal invocation of Miranda rights. However, like 
defendant, Calamity did not respond verbally when asked if he 
understood his Miranda rights, but rather, nodded his head. 
Calamity, 735 P.2d at 41. Calamity then complied with a police 
request that he write a voluntary statement, read his Miranda 
rights, and fill out a form. Calamity, 735 P.2d at 40. 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the 
supreme court concluded that Calamity's written confession "must 
be viewed as having been made under a valid waiver." Id. at 41. 
In particular, the supreme court noted the lack of evidence that 
police had in any way coerced the waiver, that Calamity was fully 
apprised he did not have to make the written the statement, and 
that Calamity benefitted from twice receiving the Miranda 
warnings. Calamity, 735 P.2d at 41. 
As in the present case, neither Kelly nor Calamity 
verbally informed police of their ultimate willingness to waive 
their Miranda rights. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373 (rejecting 
argument that valid Miranda waiver requires an express written or 
oral statement). Rather, despite his earlier hesitancy, Kelly 
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demonstrated his willingness to answer questions by pointing to 
incriminating clothing and by spontaneously making certain 
admissions. Kellv, 718 P. 2d at 392. Calamity experienced no 
hesitancy and similarly commenced to make a written statement as 
requested by police. Calamity, 735 P.2d at 40. See also 
Heaelman, 717 P.2d at 1349 (upholding waiver ruling where 
Hegelman indicated his understanding of Miranda rights, 
demonstrated no signs of fear before or after altercation with 
officer, and thereafter made incriminating statements to another 
officer when informed of the evidence against him). 
Defendant's initial hesitancy to answer the trooper's 
questions may well have been "a natural reaction to being 
questioned, [but] does not indicate that his right to remain 
silent was violated." Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 426 (Utah 1995). 
Indeed, notwithstanding his initial hesitancy, defendant 
subsequently assured the officer that he understood his rights by 
nodding his head up and down (R. 64), see addendum A. This 
affirmative conduct, followed by defendant's unhesitating and 
incriminating response to the trooper's follow up questioning, 
adequately support the trial court's determination of a valid 
Miranda waiver. Accord People v. Sully 812 P.2d 163, 185 (Cal. 
1991) (affirming waiver determination where defendant, a former 
police officer, expressly affirmed his understanding of his 
Miranda rights and then proceeded to answer questions), cert, 
denied, 503 U.S. 944 (1992); United States v. Ocrden. 572 F.2d 
501, 502 (5th Cir.) (waiver adequately indicated by defendant's 
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expression of understanding followed by an incriminating 
statement), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 979 (1978); People v. Johnson. 
450 P.2d 865, 874 (Cal.) ("Once the defendant has been informed 
of his rights and indicates that he understands those rights, it 
would seem that his choosing to speak and not requesting a lawyer 
is sufficient evidence that he knows his rights and chooses not 
to exercise them."), cert, denied, 395 U.S. 969 (1969). 
Consistent with Butler, Kelly, Calamity, and Hegelman, 
the preponderance of the evidence in this case indicates the 
trial court reasonably exercised its discretion to conclude that 
defendant's Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary. This Court should so hold. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN LIMITING DEFENDANT'S CROSS-EXAMINATION OF 
TROOPER WASSMER UNDER RULE 403, UTAH RULES OF 
EVIDENCE 
A, Waiver of Claimed Constitutional Violation 
At trial, defense counsel attempted to cross-examine 
Trooper Wassmer about the fact that the Miranda violation was not 
mentioned in the trooper's report of the incident (R. 306) (a 
copy of the pertinent portion of the transcript is attached as 
addendum B). Upon objection from the prosecutor, defense counsel 
stated: 
It's my position that it's part of our 
constitutional rights to present a defense to 
the let [sic] the jurors know that this 
officer violated the law, that being Miranda, 
and failed to put it in his police report. I 
think it's fundamental to our confrontation 
20 
(R. 308), see addendum B. 
Further, although defense counsel wanted to introduce 
the Miranda violation, she did not want to bring out the 
substance of the pre-Miranda questioning or defendant's 
incriminating responses thereto and reminded the trial court that 
that evidence had been ruled inadmissible under rules 403 and 
404, Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 308-09), see addendum B. The 
prosecutor responded that to introduce the fact of the Miranda 
violation without also introducing the questions asked and 
defendant's responses would mislead and confuse the jury (R. 
310), see addendum B. 
The trial court sustained the State's objection under 
rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence,9 ruling that the probative 
value of the evidence was outweighed by the danger of misleading 
and confusing the jury (R. 315-17), see addendum B. 
For the first time on appeal, defendant alleges that 
the trial court "precluded [him] from attacking Trooper Wassmer's 
credibility during cross-examination[,]" and that the limitation 
amounted to a violation of his "constitutional right of cross-
examination." Br. of App. at 30, 33. Defendant, however, fails 
to indicate where in the record he preserved this precise claim 
9
 Utah R. Evid. 403 provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
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below. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (5) (a) . Nor has he asserted 
plain error or any exceptional circumstance that would justify 
this Court's consideration of his constitutional claim. Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 705 n.2 (Utah 
App. 1993); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 
1992). 
Moreover, defendant's "nominal allusion" to a general 
right of confrontation below is inadequate to preserve the 
constitutional violation he alleges on appeal. See, e.g., State 
v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah 1990) ("the proper forum in 
which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis of state 
constitutional interpretation is before the trial court"). See 
also State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Utah 1989) 
(finding "general motion" below failed to "specifically or 
distinctly" preserve grounds for appeal as required by the waiver 
rule). The reference was neither distinct nor specific and 
wholly failed to articulate a federal or state constitutional 
right of confrontation that would justify admission of the 
contested evidence. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 661 (Utah 
1985) ("where a defendant fails to assert a particular ground for 
suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an 
appellate court will not consider that ground on appeal"). 
Rather than articulate how defendant's right of confrontation was 
violated (particularly where the trooper was on the stand and 
available to answer questions), defense counsel's complaint 
centered on the court's refusal to allow a line of questioning 
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which the trial court reasonably found objectionable under rule 
403 (R. 308-316), see addendum B.10 Consequently, the only 
issue properly before the Court is the propriety of the trial 
court's limitation of defendant's cross-examination under rule 
403. 
Even if the Court deems defense counsel adequately 
articulated a constitutional argument below, the trial court did 
not address the constitutional right of confrontation in its 
ruling. "[W]here defendant fails to invoke a ruling on his 
motion, he has waived the issue for purposes of appeal." State 
v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 961 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 
P.2d 113 8 (Utah 1990). Thus, the issue remains inadequately 
preserved for review. 
B. Inadequate Challenge to Trial Court's Rule 403 
Determination 
As for the propriety of the trial court's rule 403 
limitation on defendant's cross-examination of Trooper Wassmer, 
defendant has not adequately challenged the ruling on appeal. 
Defendant only briefly describes the perceived effect of the 
ruling on his defense, Br. of App. at 31, and offers no analysis 
regarding how or why the evidentiary ruling constitutes an abuse 
10
 Defendant asserts that following its rule 4 03 
determination, the trial court erroneously found that defense 
counsel "had explored the full extent of Trooper Wassmer's pre-
Miranda violations and the nature of the omissions from his 
police report[.]" Br. of App. at 31 n.9. Defendant misreads the 
record which merely reflects defense counsel's request to make a 
record of her proffered questions and the trial court's 
acknowledgement that: "the record can reflect that you've 
[defense counsel] asked the opportunity to question the officer 
about certain matters which I've ruled to be improper" (R. 320). 
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of the trial court's "broad" discretion. See State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994) (dicta). See also State v. Hamilton,26 
827 P.2d 232# 239-40 (Utah 1992) (reviewing trial court's rule 
403 determination for "reasonability"). 
To the extent the issue is mentioned in defendant's 
brief, it is merely incidental to his chief complaint concerning 
the alleged harmfulness of the claimed abridgment of his 
constitutional right of confrontation. Br. of App. at 31-35. 
Defendant's nominal complaint regarding the trial court's rule 
403 determination is inadequate under the briefing rule and 
should be rejected by the Court. Utah R. App. Pro. 24(a) (9) 
("The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . " ) . See 
State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247/ 249 n.5 (Utah App. 1992) (citing 
cases disposed of on appeal for failure to provide meaningful 
analysis and otherwise comply with the briefing rule). 
C# Trial Court Has Broad Discretion to Limit Cross-
Examination Under Rule 403 
In any event/ the constitutional right of confrontation 
is not boundless, but is properly restricted by rule 403. See, 
e.g., State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200# 203 (Utah 1987) (cross-
examination for bias properly limited under rule 403); State v. 
Cox, 826 P.2d 656/ 661 (Utah App. 1992) (same). In the present 
case, the trial court expressly weighed the limited probative 
value of impeaching the trooper with the omission of the Miranda 
violation from his report/ against its strong tendency to confuse 
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and mislead the jurors, particularly if introduced in the 
isolated context requested by defendant: 
To now attempt to bring in the officer's 
omission of the pre-Miranda statements would 
no doubt create in the jurors' minds concern 
about what was said and mislead and confuse 
them. I've ruled that pre-Miranda statements 
were not admissible, and now to attempt to 
show the officer omitted these statements 
from his report, while probative as bearing 
upon his credibility, is substantially 
outweighed, in my view, by the danger of 
misleading or confusing the jury. Therefore, 
the questioning about the claimed omission of 
the pre-Miranda statements from the officer's 
statement is disallowed. 
[T]he issue of the omission by the officer of 
these statements from his report seems to me 
to still be one of considerable import to 
this Court and the jurors' consideration of 
the issues. The statements that were made 
have been excluded. To now attempt to 
establish that by leaving them out of the 
report, whatever they were, of course, which 
won't come to the jurors' attention, would 
be, in my judgment, confusing to jury [sic] 
and very likely mislead them[,] in the sense 
that they would not know what it was that was 
omitted here, would not know why it was that 
this information is being kept from them[,] 
and potentially, therefore, I think it is --
the danger of misleading and confusing them 
far outweighs the probative value of pointing 
to an omission of an officer's report. 
(R. 315-17), see addendum B (emphasis added). 
Defendant's conclusory assertion that the above ruling 
caused the jury to be mislead concerning the trooper's 
credibility, Br. of App. at 30-31, fails to pinpoint any abuse of 
the court's broad discretion. Pena, 869 P.2d at 938. To the 
contrary, the ruling is adequately detailed and well considered. 
See Hackford, 737 P.2d at 204 (noting preference for express 
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findings in the record allowing the reviewing court to understand 
the trial court's reasons for barring or limiting cross-
examination) . 
Furthermore, defendant was afforded adequate 
opportunity to challenge the trooper's credibility before the 
jury. Defendant extensively cross-examined the trooper 
concerning the facts that the incident was neither videotaped nor 
recorded and that the trooper did not obtain a written waiver of 
rights from defendant (R. 319-320, 332-333, 337-38). Defendant 
also brought out alleged inconsistencies and discrepancies in the 
trooper's testimony including whether the trooper could remember 
which side of defendant's car was sagging (R. 321-23). Defendant 
further established that the trooper never issued a citation for 
the equipment violation, and that the trooper never reported the 
equipment violation to dispatch (R. 324) . Defense counsel 
highlighted the above testimony and other alleged inconsistencies 
in closing argument, suggesting to the jury that the trooper had 
lied and was therefore unreliable (R. 350-54). Thus, the record 
itself refutes defendant's claim that the trial court's 
limitation of cross-examination precluded his ability to attack 
the trooper's credibility. 
Moreover, consistent with the court's ruling, none of 
defendant's pre-Miranda admissions were introduced at trial. 
Indeed, there was no evidence of defendant's cocaine possession 
or his probationary status. Rather, Trooper Wassmer testified 
solely concerning defendant's post-Miranda admissions that the 
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license plates were on the wrong car and that defendant had tried 
to flee from the trooper (R. 300-01). Assuming defendant had 
prevailed in his attempt to cross-examine Trooper Wassmer 
concerning the narrow fact of the Miranda violation, he risked 
admission of his previously suppressed incriminating statements. 
As noted by the trial court, bringing out the pre-Miranda 
admissions would have been necessary to explain the circumstances 
surrounding the Miranda violation and thereby avoid undue and 
irrelevant speculation by the jury (R. 311-13). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should uphold the trial court's rulings 
admitting defendant's post-Miranda admissions and limiting 
defendant's cross-examination of Trooper Wassmer, and should 
affirm defendant's third degree felony conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^V day of June, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
fe^^/^^A^ 
HAN DECKER 
Ass i s tant A t t o r n e y General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law on Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
DAVID E.YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
ROBERT L. STOTT, Bar No. 3131 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON 
, DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPRESS 
-vs-
) Case No. 941901168FS 
ROGELIO LEYVA LIMONTA, 
' Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on September 26,1994, to hear 
argument on the defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant was represented by his attorney, 
Elizabeth Hunt, and the State was represented by Robert L. Stott. The Court having heard 
argument and evidence presented by the parties, hereby makes the following findings 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 24,1994, at approximately 9:00 PM, Utah Highway Trooper Jon Wassmer 
was on duty and traveling in his marked Highway Patrol vehicle on 1-15 near 4500 South in Salt 
Lake County. 
2. Trooper Wassmer noticed a vehicle traveling the same direction which appeared to sag 
badly on one side. 
OCT 1 1 1994 
0 0 0 6 3 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 941901168FS 
Page two 
3. Trooper Wassmer asked Dispatch to run the license plate number to determine its 
registration. He learned that the plate was registered to an 1984 Buick. 
4. The vehicle was, however, as Trooper Wassman could see, an Oldsmobile. 
5. Trooper Wassmer pulled in behind the vehicle and activated his overhead lights. 
6. Rather than stopping the vehicle immediately, increased its speed from 55 mph to 75 
mph and sped down the freeway. 
7. Trooper Wassmer activiated his siren and pursued the vehicle which eventually left 
the freeway at 90th South and crashed as it attempted to make a turn. 
8. The defendant was, and had been driving the car. 
9. Trooper Wassmer arrested the defendant and a few moments later, in Trooper 
Wassmer's car, advised the defendant of his Miranda rights by reading them from a standard DUI 
form. 
10. Trooper Wassmer asked the defendant if he understood his Miranda rights. The 
defendant replied "Yes." 
11. Trooper Wassmer asked the defendant if he would answer questions. The defendant 
stated "I don't know." Trooper Wassmer said "You don't have to answer questions if you don't 
want to. It's up to you." The defendant nodded his head in an affirmative manner. 
12. Trooper Wassmer then asked, "So why did you run?" The defendant immediately 
answered, "The plates are on the wrong car." 
13. Trooper Wassmer did not record this conversation. 
WHEREFORE, having entered its Findings of Facts, the Court now makes the following 
conclusions 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The stop and arrest of the defendant by Trooper Wassmer was based upon his 
observing traffic violations occurring in his presense: license plate violation, speeding, and 
failure to respond to an officer's signal. 
2. The defendant's arrest and stop did not violate either Utah or United States 
constitutional provisions. 
3. Proper Miranda warnings were administered to the defendant by Trooper Wassmer. 
4. The defendant understood his Miranda rights. 
5. The defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights 
before questioning fasued. 
6. The questions and answers given post-Miranda are admissible in the trial. 
7. Trooper Wassmer's in the field unrecorded questioning of the defendant did not 
violate any of the defendant's constitutional rights. 
DATED this Jfl^day of October, 1994. 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
ROBERT L. STOTT, Bar No. 3131 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
By. 
Third J'jQ.CiSi DioUiCt 
OCT 1 1 1994 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ROGELIO LEYVA LIMONTA, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 941901168FS 
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
Based upon the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. 
DATED this [[trday of October, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Elizabeth 
Hunt, at the office of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, 
Salt Lake City Ut 84111, this day of October, 1994. 
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ADDENDUM B 
Transcript of Suppression Hearing 
Q How many days? 
A Just a few. 
Q And is it your position that the report is 
complete? 
A I believe so, yes. 
Q It's your testimony today that you approached 
Mr, Leyva after his car had stopped, and when you approached 
him, you gave him Miranda warnings and then proceeded to 
interrogate him and then proceeded to obtain a confession, 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And that's what your report says, too, right? 
A It does. 
Q In fact, didn't you ask Mr. Leyva some incriminat-
ing questions before you ever gave him the Miranda warnings? 
A I did ask him one question before. 
MR. STOTT: Your Honor, may we approach the bench? 
THE COURT: All right. Come up here, folks. 
(Whereupon, both counsel and the Court conferred 
at the bench out of the hearing of the jury and the 
Reporter.) 
THE COURT: Members of the jury, we have come upon 
an issue of law that I must resolve with the lawyers in this 
case. It's near enough, however, to your noon recess that 
I'm going to release you and remind you again of the 
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admonition I've given you. 
You are free until 1:30 this afternoon, at which 
time we'll reconvene and hear the balance of the evidence in 
the case. The jury is now excused. 
(Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: Okay. The jury has now left the court-
room. There appears to be a difference of view about what 
was or was not stipulated to, and I want you to state, 
Mr. Stott, for the record your objection or request from the 
bench conference and I'll hear from Ms. Hunt. 
MR. STOTT: Well, I gathered from our discussion at 
the bench that her intent is to try to establish that somehow 
the officer violated Miranda warnings. So my position is 
that we've had a hearing on that and the Court ruled that 
there was no Miranda warning violation, and also the State 
did not inquire into any questioning that went on before the 
Miranda warnings were given, so I think it's improper for her 
to now somehow try to imply that the officer failed to give 
the correct Miranda warning when, one, we aren't using that 
as part of our evidence and, two, the Court made a ruling 
that Miranda warnings were complied with. 
THE COURT: All right. Ms. Hunt, do you wish to 
respond? 
MS. HUNT: I do, your Honor. I have the prelim-
inary hearing transcript and also the motion hearing 
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transcript which clearly establishes a Miranda violation. 
Mr. Stott himself stated at the hearing on the motion to 
suppress that there was, quote, some indication that there 
was a conversation before Miranda. I have no intentions of 
bringing out any of that conversation. 
Now, the fact that Mr. Stott is not bringing in 
that conversation is immaterial because the officer suppos-
edly got the confession before and after Miranda, the content 
being the same. 
It's my position that it's part of our constitu-
tional rights to present a defense to the let the jurors know 
that this officer violated the law, that being Miranda, and 
failed to put it in his police report. I think it's funda-
mental to our confrontation. 
THE COURT: It's been some time since the suppres-
sion hearing. What was the question asking and what was the 
response given to the question that you're referring to that 
was presumably prior to Miranda? 
MS. HUNT: Well, that's not clear because the offi-
cer is not being consistent as to what the conversations 
were. However, I can find the exact pages of each transcript 
for you if you'd give me just a minute. 
Bob, I gave you a copy of the motion hearing tran-
script. Do you have that? 
MR. STOTT: The motion or the prelim? 
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MS. HUNT: The motion hearing transcript. 
I believe page 20 of the motion hearing transcript 
establishes — 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not so much interested where 
in the transcript it was dealt with, I suppose, as I am 
interested to know what it is you're eliciting from the 
officer. 
Now, if it's your point that the officer asked a 
question and the Defendant made a response that was prior to 
the giving of the Miranda warning, that was not, as I recall, 
I didn't recall that having been gone into as being part of 
your motion to suppress. 
MS. HUNT: It was. I guess I didn't make myself 
clear, your Honor. The question reflected in the motion 
hearing transcript was that he asked him why he ran before he 
gave him a Miranda warning. He asked him whether he was on 
probation. Obviously I'm not going to bring that out in 
front of the jury because this Court has excluded that on 
grounds of 404, 403. He showed him the cocaine before the 
Miranda warning and he says he doesn't recall whether he 
asked him about the cocaine. 
THE COURT: But that has not been part of the 
State's examination in chief. You're telling me, as I under-
stand you, that you're not seeking the content of the ques-
tion asked or the answer given, but simply that there was a 
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question asked and there was an answer given, and that that 
was prior to giving the Miranda warning, but that that does 
not appear in the report? 
MS. HUNT: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Is there any objection to 
that? 
MR. STOTT: Well, yes. I think for the jury to be 
able to understand what she's getting at, they ought to know 
what the question and answer is. Just to say there was a 
question given and not know what the question was, or an 
answer was given and not know what the answer was, it's going 
to mislead the jury. 
I think they should see the total picture because 
now we're getting into stuff that we agreed we wouldn't get 
into. 
THE COURT: Well, you keep referring to an agree-
ment, but apparently it's a one-sided agreement, Mr. Stott. 
I don't see Ms. Hunt agreeing to anything. 
MR. STOTT: No, what I'm talking about is the 
cocaine and the probation because that's what the conversa-
tion was about. 
THE COURT: Prior to the Miranda? 
MR. STOTT: Yes. Also her Miranda motion went to 
this particular conversation. It seems to me that if there's 
a Miranda violation, then the evidence is not introduced, but 
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the fact of a Miranda violation is not relevant. 
THE COURT: Well, I can't apparently establish that 
there was or was not an agreement that the inquiry that took 
place prior to the Miranda was going to be excluded. 
MR. STOTT: I stated on the record — 
THE COURT: Well, yeah, I guess I know your posi-
tion that it's not going to be introduced, but it may be an 
offer that was not accepted by Ms. Hunt, and if that is the 
case, then I suppose if the issue — if there's no agreement, 
in other words, I have ruled on what I understood to be the 
issues before me at the suppression hearing and if now you're 
inquiring into statements made and responses given by the 
Defendant that you contend were inappropriate, then I suppose 
that there is a significant chance that I will allow on 
redirect examination what was said and by whom. Do you 
follow me? 
MS. HUNT: I do. 
THE COURT: I think it is probably not the appro-
priate thing to do on the one hand to argue that the officer 
has violated Miranda by obtaining information from this 
Defendant to show that he is something less than stellar in 
his investigation, yet, on the same hand, argue that all of 
that discussion cannot be brought in. It may well be appro-
priate and fair, it seems to me, if that's the essence of 
your argument, then on redirect examination the officer be 
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allowed to state what it was that was said. 
MS. HUNT: May I respond, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MS. HUNT: Thank you. This Court excluded all 
reference to cocaine and to the fact that Mr. Leyva was on 
probation. The Court's exclusion — 
THE COURT: Well, but the reference to the exclud-
ing of the cocaine was in response to the State's agreement 
not to introduce it. 
MS. HUNT: That's right. 
THE COURT: It had nothing to do with your motion. 
MS. HUNT: Oh, that wasn't clear to me. 
THE COURT: That was an acknowledgement by the 
State that they were not going to even get into the issue of 
cocaine possession. Consequently, as I recall, and I may be 
wrong about this, but I recall we were dealing specifically 
with statements made by the Defendant having to do with wrong 
plates on the car and out past time. 
MS. HUNT: I think the cocaine issue is probably a 
moot point as far as what we're talking about now because the 
officer's testimony was that he didn't recall whether he 
asked about the cocaine or not, so I don't think the 
Prosecutor would need to bring that to the jury's attention 
because the officer doesn't recall it. 
THE COURT: Well, but there was a comment made 
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about cocaine or at least cocaine was observed. 
MS. HUNT: No, that was only my question. It was 
observed, yes, but that's not part of the Miranda violation. 
THE COURT: I'm not quite clear on what it is we're 
doing other than trying through a back door to try to get out 
another hearing on a motion to suppress, and that may be 
wrong. I'm not saying it's right or wrong, Ms. Hunt, but it 
appears to me that if indeed statements made prior to Miranda 
warning were part of your motion to suppress and the ruling 
on those had to do with what was a presumed stipulation that 
the evidence would not be relied upon by the State, that was 
the basis of my ruling, not because of the evidence in the 
hearing but what I'm going to do is I'm going to allow us all 
to take this under consideration for a moment. I'm not say-
ing that if you elicit from the officer the fact that he 
omitted to include in his report this pre-Miranda statement 
or statements, therefore, he's something less than a compe-
tent officer, I'm not going to rule yet on whether or not by 
opening that door he's going to be able to say what it was 
that he told the Defendant because apparently there was — or 
the Defendant told him because apparently there was no agree-
ment between you two that that wouldn't be brought into 
trial, so if you open the door, I may well determine to allow 
the officer to testify as to what was in fact said, and I'll 
let you know that at 1:30. 
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We'll be in recess until 1:30. 
(Whereupon, a recess was taken.) 
THE COURT: We are reconvened in the instant matter 
outside the hearing of the jury. The Defendant and both 
counsel are present. 
Counsel, I have taken under advisement the objec-
tion, or at least the indication that there would be an 
objection to further inquiry of the trooper with regard to 
the omission in his report of the pre-Miranda statements 
engaged in between the officer and the Defendant. 
Having reviewed my notes of the suppression hear-
ing, as well as the transcript and Exhibit 1, the officer's 
report received during the course of that suppression hear-
ing, I'm prepared to rule at this time. 
This Court ruled that the questioning before the 
Miranda warning was excluded originally and this because the 
State agreed not to introduce such statements and because 
eliciting inculpatory statements prior to giving Miranda are 
properly excludable. However, here the Defendant seeks to 
introduce only that the trooper omitted reference to such 
statements in his report, ostensibly for the purpose of bear-
ing on the credibility of the officer's testimony, without 
getting into what was actually said. 
The motion to suppress refers, in this Court's 
view, only to post-Miranda waiver and/or statements. The 
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issue of omission of statements pre-Miranda was not 
addressed, in this Court's view, because the State conceded 
not to attempt introduction at the trial, but in any event, 
Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence allows this Court discre-
tion to exclude relevant evidence if it is probative, even 
though it may be probative, if the value of such evidence is 
substantially outweighed by, among other things, confusing 
the issues or misleading the jury. 
Here the State has not sought, rightly so, to 
introduce the pre-Miranda statements. There was an agreement 
by Defense counsel at the suppression hearing, found on page 
27, line 21 of the transcript of that hearing, wherein she 
concedes, "I have no intentions of bringing out any of that 
conversation before Miranda. I would agree that the 
Defendant was in custody at the time of the questioning which 
followed Miranda was given, so there's no question about 
custody in this particular case. I believe he was in 
custody." 
To now attempt to bring in the officer's omission 
of the pre-Miranda statements would no doubt create in the 
jurors' minds concern about what was said and mislead and 
confuse them. I've ruled that pre-Miranda statements were 
not admissible, and now to attempt to show the officer 
omitted these statements from his report, while probative as 
bearing upon his credibility, is substantially outweighed, in 
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my view, by the danger of misleading or confusing the jury. 
Therefore, the questioning about the claimed omission of the 
pre-Miranda statements from the officer's statement is dis-
allowed, so now let's bring the jury back in. 
Ms. Hunt, you're waving your hand. 
MS. HUNT: I am. May I have the benefit of the 
record just for a moment, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
MS. HUNT: Thank you very much. First of all, I'd 
like to call to the Court's attention that the portion of the 
motion hearing transcript that the Court just quoted was 
Mr. Stott speaking, not me. 
THE COURT: Well, that's an important observation. 
MS. HUNT: What I want to ask the officer is simply 
if he asked Mr. Limonta incriminating questions — Mr. Leyva, 
excuse me, incriminating questions before the Miranda warn-
ings and if he omitted that from his report. 
The reason I want to do that is because it estab-
lishes both that that officer himself is breaking the law and 
that he's also excluding that from his report which is sup-
posed to be documenting this case. I feel that this is inte-
gral to our defense. We don't have much to work with in this 
case other than to confront and cross-examine the officer. 
The Miranda ruling itself excludes only the 
Defendant's statements. If there's a Miranda violation, it 
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does not exclude the fact that there was a Miranda violation, 
nor the officer's question. 
That's about all I have to say as far as the 
Court's ruling goes. 
THE COURT: Well, and that's fine. Let me first 
address the issue of the misquote. I apologize for having 
viewed Mr. Stott's language as that of your own. Neverthe-
less, my view is even had there not been an agreement, which 
apparently there was not, the issue of the omission by the 
officer of these statements from his report seems to me to 
still be one of considerable import to this Court and the 
jurors' consideration of the issues. The statements that 
were made have been excluded. To now attempt to establish 
that by leaving them out of the report, whatever they were, 
of course, which won't come to the jurors' attention, would 
be, in my judgment, confusing to jury and very likely mislead 
them in the sense that they would not know what it was that 
was omitted here, would not know why it was that this infor-
mation is being kept from them and potentially, therefore, I 
think it is — the danger of misleading and confusing them 
far outweighs the probative value of pointing to an omission 
of an officer's report. Therefore, the ruling is the same, 
so we'll bring the jury back in, let you continue with your 
examination of the trooper within the confines of the ruling 
that I've now made. 
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